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Real Options: Strategic Technology Migration 
Options in Wireless Industry 
 
Hak Ju Kim 





The major US wireless operators already have announced their plans for evolution of their networks, but some uncertainties 
remain, such as emergence of new technologies (WiMAX and WLAN) and consolidation among operators (AT&T Mobile 
and Sprint Nextel). The paper proposes a real option based model for technology decisions and applies it to the US wireless 
industry as a case study. We also discuss what decisions are made, what the outcomes are, and how the options model is 
validated. The preliminary results show that the evolution of wireless network technologies between generations (inter-
generations migration scenario) is desirable (a positive net option value), but not desirable (a negative net option value) 
within generations (intra-generation migration scenario).  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the late 1990s, AT&T Wireless and Cingular Wireless each faced a critical decision. The TDMA technology that they 
chose earlier that decade was approaching obsolescence; the data communications features that were beginning to be 
demanded by the marketplace had not been developed for this technology platform, nor would they be by equipment 
manufacturers.  Thus, to remain competitive in the marketplace, these mobile service providers had to switch to a CDMA or 
GSM-based platform.  This transition meant replacing all of their base station and switching hardware as well as customer 
handsets in an orderly fashion. Although both carriers ultimately chose GSM (and ultimately merged to become today’s 
AT&T Mobile), the decision process has received little attention in the literature despite the enormous business and financial 
risks involved.  This paper uses this decision, using the information available at the time, to propose the real options based 
model for technology decisions. 
By early 2007, the US wireless market (CTIA, 2006; FCC, 2006) was dominated by AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless and 
Sprint Nextel, together accounting for more than 70% market share. T-Mobile, Alltel and US Cellular make up the next tier, 
accounting for about 20%. In 3G networks, Verizon Wireless and Sprint Nextel provided cdma2000 technology, while 
AT&T Mobility and T-Mobile offered WCDMA technology. Recently, Sprint Nextel began deploying a WiMAX network, 
preparing for the next round of competition, in 4G technologies (Polivka, 2007).  
As seen in Figure 1, the current US wireless market simply can be broken down into two dimensions; three types of customer 
groups and three types of network operator groups. In the customer groups, 1) First group is new customers who have never 
used wireless services, 2) Second group is customers who move from their current 1G services (Actually 1G service was 
stopped after 2004 in the US), and 3) Third group is customers who move from their current 2G services. In the network 
operator groups, 1) Firm A-type group is the existing hybrid service providers offering 1G and 2G technologies, like Verizon 
and AT&T Wireless. 2) Firm B-type group is the existing service providers only offering 2G services, like Sprint PCS and T-
Mobile, and Nextel. C) Finally, Firm C-type group is the potential new service providers only offering 3G services, i.e., 
WCDMA and cdma2000. Based on these simplified market structure, the issues are; 1) how to assess the value of technology 
migration as a basis of technology migration strategy? 2) what is a firm’s migration strategy for 3G including what 
technology, when, and how to migrate ?  
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Figure 1. Market Structure and Operator Groups 
 
The goal of this study is to develop a theoretical framework using the real options approach (ROA) for wireless operators to 
support their strategic decisions when considering technology choices as they move to the next generation networks. Our 
study does not give an absolute value for the choice of technology, but provide some inferences by attempting to quantify the 
value of technology migration strategy as a basic element of strategic decision-making. As a result, this study intends to raise 
core issues concerning the transition towards 3G.  
The real options approach RROA) has been applied to several industries, such as oil (Paddock et al., 1988), mining (Kemma, 
1993), pharmaceutical (Micalizzi, 1999), airline industry (Stonier, 1999), and electricity (Deng et al., 2001). Recently, along 
with the wide acceptance of real options, many academics and practitioners are actively working to apply real options in the 
information and communications technology (ICT) sector (Clemons, 1991; Kumar, 2002; Benaroch, 2002; Alleman & 
Rapport, 2006) have recognized the importance of utilizing the theory of real options to justify the option-like characteristics 
of ICT investments. Although the theory of real options provides a theoretically rigorous framework to analyze the optimal 
exercise of options, people have expressed a number of concerns related to the efficacy of applying option pricing theory to 
ICT sector. The focus of this paper is on the applications of real options methodology to the ICT sector, especially wireless 
industry.  We hope this will give the reader a good foundation to begin understanding and appreciating the significance of 
this approach.   
   
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Real Options: A Brief Overview 
The options paradigm in investment decision-making began from Black-Scholes(1973)’ option theory, which offered some 
valuation tools under the underlying sources of uncertainty with continuous time, assuming ‘Brownian motions (random 
walk)’. Brennan & Schwartz (1985) and McDonald & Siegel (1986) were the first to actually employ options thinking in the 
valuation of real assets (i.e., projects), which has become known as ‘real options’. After following them, Dixit & Pindyck 
(1995) and Trigeorgis (1996) deal with the issue of the timing of investment when there is competition in the product market. 
After that, real options have been popular in several industries, such as oil (Paddock, 1988; Pickles & Smith, 1993), mining 
(Brennan & Schwartz, 1985), pharmaceutical research (Micalizzi, 1999), information technology (IT) (Benaroch & 
Kauffman, 2000; Kim & Sanders, 2002), and other investment activities (Deng et al., 2001; Cheng et al., 2005).   
Real options are simply defined as the right, but not the obligation to take some actions in the future (Dixit & Pindyck, 1995). 
That is, real options involve discretionary decisions or rights without any obligation to acquire or exchange an asset for a 
specified alternative price (Amram & Kulatilaka, 1998). The basic idea of real options is the logic for the ability to provide 
access to significant upside potential, while containing downside losses makes options more valuable with greater volatility.  
The fundamental importance of Real Options has been recognized in academia (Pindyck, 1989; Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; 
Trigeorgis, 1996; Amram & Kulatilaka, 1998; Benaroch & Kauffman, 2000; Kim & Sanders, 2002) as a strategic tool to 
manage uncertainty. Real option is a tool to assess potential opportunities and uncertainty as a positive value, through 
managerial flexibility. Managerial flexibility is a set of real options, for example, the options to defer, abandon, contract, or 
expand investment, or switch investment to an alternative (Trigeorgis, 1993). It is often not explicitly taken into account 
when comparing a project's tangible costs and benefits by the traditional, discounted cash flow approach (e.g., NPV and IRR).  
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The ROA may be a useful tool for a firm’s technology management because firms are often faced with higher degrees of 
uncertainty when making strategic investment decisions. 
NPV calculates the difference between the present value of cash inflows from the investment and the present value of cash 
outflows initially invested. If the NPV of a project results in a positive amount, the project should be undertaken. However, if 
NPV is negative, the project should be rejected because net cash flows will also be negative. The NPV method explicitly 
assumes that the project will meet the expected cash flow without any intervention by management during the process. 
Rather, all the uncertainty can be handled by a single risk-adjusted discount rate. That is, there is no dynamics in a project. It 
is static; never or now. However, the ROA has distinctive ability to capture managers’ flexibility in adapting their future 
actions, such as waiting, staging, changing, abandoning, switching, and growing (Trigeorgis, 1996) in response to evolving 
markets or technological conditions. Further, it provides that uncertainty can create value by expanding a positive side 
(profit) and limiting a negative side (loss) by management’s flexibility. This is appealing to the firms under high uncertain 
technology environment as a strategic technology management tool. 
 
Technology Assessment Options Model  
Definitions and Assumptions 
Let the value of technology investment in the revolutionary technology (i.e. CDMA-based) compared with the evolutionary 
(i.e. GSM-based) be ‘H’. Also let P and B be the net value of two alternatives of network migration by the choice of strategy 
at time t.: One (P) is a revolutionary technology change with a larger risk and investment (‘aggressive’) and the other (B) is a 
stepping-stone technology change with a smaller risk and investment (‘conservative’).  
Assuming that the level of investment for improving network performance is directly related to their revenues, the key issue 
in the choice of strategic options is how to quantify a trade-off between the level of performance improvement and the value 
of premium in a risk neutral situation. Risk neutrality means comparing one portfolio where an investment is in stepping-
stone architecture with a premium to the other portfolio where an investment is in the revolutionary architecture with 
potentially higher value. 
Technology Transition Option Value 
We treat the choice between the two scenarios as a comparison between two wireless network technology migration 
portfolios. Again, let P correspond to a high level of uncertainty (potentially high value) with a much larger investment cost, 
and B correspond to a lower level of uncertainty with a much smaller investment cost. Two scenarios are defined as: 
• Revolutionary portfolio )( REVW = PPν  (i.e. CDMA-based architecture) 
• Evolutionary portfolio )( EVOW = BBν  (i.e. GSM-based architecture) 
where Pν  and Bν  are amounts invested in each scenario. 
To compare the two “portfolios”, we introduce a quantity ( )BPH ,  which is defined as: 
REVEVOtHEVOH WWWWH =+=+ν  
Using the derivative, it can be described as: 
( ) dBdPvBPdH BPH νν −=,  






dHW EVOREVH −=  (1) 
   P: the present value of revolutionary technology (CDMA) 
   B: the present value of evolutionary technology (GSM) 
   WREV: the weighted present value of revolutionary technology (CDMA) 
   WEVO: the weighted present value of evolutionary technology (GSM) 
   H(P,B): the option value of technology migration 
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One way to interpret EQ.(1) is to interpret ( )BPH ,  as the value of the option of investing in the revolutionary technology 
instead of the evolutionary one and to treat 
EVOREVH WWW −=  as the value of the premium that should be paid to accomplish 
higher network performance, under the assumption of risk neutrality. ( )BPH ,  quantifies the maximum premium that should 
be paid to reduce the uncertainty associated with the evolutionary approach to technology migration. In other words, as long 
as the actual value of the premium paid for the higher network performance is smaller than ( )BPH , , it is more advantageous to 
go for the revolutionary technology.   
After some manipulation (See Appendix 1), we derived the expression of ( )TPBH ,,  in terms of the value of the evolutionary 
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In equation 2, ( )τδρσδσ 22 2 +−=T  is the cumulative uncertainty over the time horizon “τ”.  
When δσ >> , τσ 2≈T . When the variability is zero, equation 2 becomes: ( ) ],0[0,, PBMaxPBH −= . Equation 2 
provides an expression for the equivalent of an option ( )TPBH ,, . ( )TPBH ,,  is the extra value of using high technology in risk 
neutral condition.  
 Since our real option model can assess the transition value from old technology to new technology, we attempt to 
test the value of technology transition, from generation to generation (inter-generation transition), and within the same 
generations (intra-generation transition). For example, the parameters for our model consist of H (option value), B (the value 
new technology), P (the value of old technology) and T (accumulated uncertainty). Market shares in wireless market are used 
as the value of B and P because we consider that the value of technology is proportional to market power (i.e. market share). 
Modern, complex technologies often display increasing returns to adoption [67] in that the more it is adopted, the more 
experience is gained with it and the more it is improved (which is directly connected to the value of technology). 
Decision Criteria Rule 
As seen in equation (3), the value of the option (H) should offset the premium (P-B) at least. The premium is an 
opportunity cost to give up some benefits from the existing technology. 




TPBHBPTPBH              (3) 
 
SIMULATION AND THE RESULTS 
Research Design 
Figure 2 illustrates the research design of this study. Two types of technology migration paths are identified: (1) Inter-
Generational Technology Migration Path and (2) Intra-Generational Technology Migration Path. First, Inter-Generational 
Technology Migration Path deals with moving from one generation technology to another, for example, analog-to-TDMA, 
analog-to-GSM, and analog-to-CDMA. The other type, Intra-Generational Technology Migration Path, i.e., movement 
within the same generation technology, includes cases such as TDMA-to-GSM, TDMA-CDMA, and GSM-to-CDMA. Based 
on this structure, a total of sixteen scenarios have been constructed.  
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Figure 2. Research Design 
 
The scenarios demonstrate the possible transitions of wireless technology and how they might change the value of networks. 
These scenarios are based on assumptions that had to be made about the future. That the future follows these suggestions is 
extremely unlikely, but still the scenarios may provide a firm’s manager with some new views and foster the own creativity 
in thinking about the influence of new technology.  
Several assumptions are applied when we construct these scenarios as follows: First, it is impossible to backward 
technologically. That is, a firm always prefers new technologies instead of old technologies. Second, a firm can only use one 
technology when it decides to migrate. Third, there is no limitation to technological choice. At present, GSM is standardized 
in Europe, but we allow that any technology can be chosen, as is the case in the US. 
Based on these assumptions, the following alternative technology migration paths are developed. 
• Inter-Generational Migration 
Analog => TDMA, Analog =>GSM, Analog => CDMA 
TDMA => cdma2000, TDMA => WCDMA 
GSM => cdma2000, GSM => WCDMA 
CDMA => cdma2000, CDMA => WCDMA 
• Intra-Generational Migration 
TDMA => GSM 
TDMA => CDMA 
GSM   => CDMA 
Data Collection 
Figure 3 plots the number of subscribers in each wireless technology from 1990 to 2004 in the US. Unlike GSM’s dominant 
position in world wireless market, CDMA has experienced high growth and dominates US wireless market. TDMA also 
covers high market share, but will eventually obsolete as providers upgrade to more advanced technologies, such as GSM, 








































Figure 3. US Wireless Market Size 
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Based on the number of subscribers in generation (Figure 3), Figure 4 shows market shares for the various technologies in the 
US wireless industry. It provides a better picture of the relative size of US wireless market. The chart clearly shows the 
dramatic growth in CDMA and TDMA, while analog fades away. 
















































Figure 4. US Wireless Market Share 
 
Simulation Results  
Inter-Generational Technology Transition (1G=>2G) 
The first scenario is to move from Analog to TDMA network architecture in the US. Figure 5 shows that the premium value 
begins as positive and gradually decreases, becoming negative after 2000. While option value is negative at the initial stage, 
it gradually increases and becomes positive in 2000. Net option value is negative for a long time, but becomes positive after 
2000. Analog technology in the US has been popular for a long time, partly because it served as the basic technology in an 
environment with incompatible 2G standards. The only difference between the two markets relates to timing. Compared to 
the rest of the world, analog technology in the US has maintained a dominant position for about two years more, so the 
transition period to TDMA will be longer.  














Figure 5. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (Analog to TDMA) 
 
Figure 6 shows the results of moving from Analog to GSM network technologies. In this case, the result is similar to the 
previous case. The premium value decreases continuously, but the option value increases gradually because of the high 
growth rate of GSM technology, resulting in a negative net option value until 2001, when it becomes positive. So, the 
transition from 1G to 2G is desirable starting in 2001 or later. 
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Figure 6. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (Analog to GSM) 
 
Moving from Analog to CDMA network technology is totally different results with world market.  Unlike world market, the 
transition is desirable starting in 2000 or later (Figure 7). CDMA is rapidly growing in the US market, so the transition is 
suggested as soon as possible. However, CDMA in the world market is not strong compared to GSM. This is why different 
results are coming. 














Figure 7. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (Analog to CDMA) 
 
Intra-Generational Technology Transition (2G=>2G) 
The next scenario (Figure 8) displays the value curve when moving from TDMA to GSM network technology. This analysis 
shows that the transition is undesirable because the premium value is positive continuously and the option value is always 
negative. Since the net option value fluctuates in the level of negative over time, transition should be delayed or never. Since 
TDMA and GSM is similar technology and don’t need to invest in this transition. However, in reality, operators prefers to 
transit from TDMA to GSM as a stepping stone evolution, like AT&T Wireless. 
 
Figure 8. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (TDMA to GSM) 
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Kim  Real Options: Strategic Technology Migrations in Wireless Industry 
Proceedings of the Fourteenth Americas Conference on Information Systems, Toronto, ON, Canada August 14th-17th 2008 8 
Another 2G scenario (Figure 9) is the transition from TDMA to CDMA network technology. The premium value decreases 
rapidly and then decreases continuously because of CDMA’s popularity in the market. NOV is positive starting in 2001, and 
increases continually. NOV is achieved a peak in 2003 and then decreases gradually. So, the transition from TDMA to CDMA 
is most desirable in 2003 and less desirable after that, although NOV is positive. 
 
Figure 9. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (TDMA to CDMA) 
 
Figure 10 shows the movement from GSM to CDMA network technology. This transition is recommended because the 
premium value is initially negative and continues to steadily negative and option value is positive continually. However, 
NOV decreases gradually after a peak of 2003. So, the transition to move CDMA from GSM is desirable. This result is 
completely different from world market. This difference is clear because GSM dominates the market (over 70%) in world, 
while CDMA is more popular than GSM in the US market.  
 
Figure 10. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (GSM to CDMA) 
 
Transition to 3G 
Figure 11 shows the transition from GSM to WCDMA (3G) network technology.  The premium value decreases continuously, 
and finally is negative after 2008. The option value is steadily negative, but positive after 2009. NOV is initially negative, but 
highly increases and positive after 2009. So, the transition is desirable starting in 2009 or later.  




















Figure 11. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (GSM to WCDMA) 
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The next scenario (Figure 12) displays the value curve when moving from CDMA to cdma2000 network technology. These 
results show that the transition is undesirable because the premium value is positive continuously until 2010 (saturation 
point) and the option value is always negative. Since the net option value increases in the level of negative over time, so 
transition should be delayed or never. 
















Figure 12. The Value Curve of Technology Transition (CDMA to CDMA2000) 
 
STRATEGIC DECISIONS FOR TECHNOLOGY EVOLUTION 
The major US wireless operators already have announced their plans for evolution of their networks, but some uncertainties 
remain, such as emergence of new technologies (WiMAX and WLAN) and consolidation among operators (AT&T Mobile 
and Sprint Nextel). In addition, TDMA-based operators are not yet clear which technology path is taken.  
Now, we discuss what decisions were made, what the outcomes were, and how the options model was validated. Figure 16 
summarized the assessment results of all technology transition scenarios in the US wireless industry.  
 
Figure 13: Summary of Technology Evolution Assessment 
 
Stage I: Analog to 2G(Inter-Generation Migration) 
Moving from analog to any 2G technology is desirable (all positive); however, the best choice for analog carriers is to move 
to CDMA in 2004 because it showed the highest option value (0.6978) of the three possibilities (TDMA, GSM, and CDMA). 
From 2000 to 2004, TDMA was a leader in market, but CDMA was rapidly growing market share with high capacity and call 
quality, although it was not matured technology (high uncertainty). As a result, the US wireless market was dominated by 
CDMA-based operators (i.e., Verizon Wireless and Sprint, together accounting for more than 50% in the US wireless market) 
in 2004. So, our result using the model was shown right direction in technology evolution path. 
Stage II: 2G to 2G (Intra-Generation Migration) 
Until now, three popular 2G technologies (i.e., TDMA, GSM, and CDMA) have competed in the US wireless market.  
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First, let’s look at a scenario moving TDMA to GSM. The result shows that it is not desirable because all transition values 
during experimental periods (from 2001 to 2010) are negative. This result conflicts with the current US wireless industry. 
Many TDMA-based operators including AT&T Mobile changed into GSM network. Next, moving from TDMA to CDMA is 
desirable in our model because of the positive net option value of 0.1972 in 2003. However, there was no company to transit 
from TDMA into CDMA in the US wireless market. The last scenario is to move from GSM to CDMA. In the case of GSM-
based operators, moving to 2G CDMA is recommended because of the positive transition option value (0.4654) in 2003.  
Then, why are the results by option model and the operators’ decisions not consistent in intra-generation scenarios? Does it 
fail to validate our option model? If not, how can we explain this gap? At this point, although our model could not explain it, 
intuitively the transition costs between incompatible technologies (i.e., TDMA and CDMA, GSM and CDMA) may exceed 
potential revenues (i.e., option value). And another reason is that only market (macro) data is available for technology 
assessment in our study. If we use data of an individual firm, we may draw more meaningful results. 
Stage III: 2G to 3G (Inter-Generation Migration) 
The transition from GSM to 3G has a similar positive option value for WCDMA (0.1928) and cdma2000 (0.1840) in 2010. In 
reality, WCDMA deployment is already de facto evolution. Many GSM-based mobile operators are considered WCDMA as 
the preferred evolution path because many GSM-based operators are from Europe and only considers WCDMA migration for 
technical and political reasons. Since new radio access network (UTRAN) needs to be deployed, WCDMA evolution requires 
substantial new investment for GSM-based operators. So, GSM-based operator may consider step-by-step evolution (i.e., 
GSM-GPRS) towards 3G, by minimizing initial infrastructure investment.  
If GSM-based operators choose cdma2000 (even unlikely), there are two possible strategies; one is to maintain a parallel 
cdma2000 network and the other is the integration of cdma2000 network within the GSM network. The former is more costly 
with running double networks, but supports more favorable market requirement. The latter is less costly with a single 
overlaid network, but higher coverage (i.e., lower population density areas). 
CDMA operators do not consider 3G until 2010 because of the continuing negative transition values, but the transition will 
occur some time after arriving at the saturation point of current 2G CDMA market. The evolution path from 2G CDMA 
(cdmaOne) to cdma2000 appears technically and economically straightforward, by minimizing initial infrastructure 
investment. The evolution of CDMA-based (i.e., cdmaOne) network to cdma2000 is already taking place on significant scale. 
For CDMA-based operators, cdma2000 evolution would require minimum investment and smooth transition without any 
technical difficulty. cdma2000 evolution refers to the subsequent evolution steps for current cdmaOne operators; from DO 
(data only) to DV (data and video). Sprint PCS moved directly from cdma 1X to DV.  
The WCDMA evolution of CDMA-based operators would be a completely new network being overlaid on the existing CDMA 
installed base, so it seems unlikely. However, it may happen by regulatory or political factors. For example, partly owned 
(40%) by the Vodafone Group in UK, Verizon wireless has been started pressure to integrate Verizon’s network (CDMA-
based network) into Vodafone’s network (GSM-based network), with centralized service development and common 
technology platforms. This suggests that Vodafone may aim to eventually force Verizon onto WCDMA evolution. 
Concerning the transition from TDMA to 3G technologies, there is not much difference in transition option value between 
WCDMA (0.0372) and cdma2000 (0.0289) in 2010. However, the TDMA evolution is controversial. Actually TDMA-based 
operators cannot evolve directly to 3G, but must choose between a CDMA-based path and a GSM-based path. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper overviewed wireless technologies from 1G to 2G and 3G, and investigated its technology options with two 
technology migration paths. We proposed a real option based model for technology decisions and applied it to the US 
wireless industry as a case study. We also discussed what decisions were made, what the outcomes were, and how the options 
model was validated. The preliminary results show that the evolution of wireless network technologies between generations 
(inter-generations migration scenario) is desirable (a positive net option value), but not desirable (a negative net option 
value) within generations (intra-generation migration scenario). 
Managerial Implications 
The main theme of this paper, ‘The Application of Real Options to Technology Management’, introduces a new perspective 
on the technology management field, such as options thinking in technology choice. This study attempts to simplify the 
theory and show how to use real options from choosing theory, analyzing problems, and to developing a simple model. One 
of the most popular criticisms of real options is that it is too descriptive and difficult to apply on real world, although it is 
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recognized as an excellent theory. Another objection is that the approach is buried too deeply in mathematics and it is 
difficult to extract the meaning of the results. This paper will contribute to make real options easier to use. 
The findings of our study imply that strategic technology choice is extremely important determinant of firm’s 
competitiveness. Exploring the dimensions of strategic decisions proved to be valuable, as the study found that it is important 
for a firm to have strategic flexibility is extremely high for improving a firm’s value. The study also found that strategic 
technology choice is important regardless of the level of environmental uncertainty faced by the firm. Since the next 
generation wireless network technologies and architectures are still a subject of debate with no substantial implementation 
results, there is much work to do. With the further research, the scope of study can be expanded. 
In a practice, this study intends to raise core issues concerning the transition to 3G. Consequently, this study will help 
wireless operators make strategic decisions when upgrading or migrating towards the next generation network architecture, 
by showing which network migration path leads to the most optimum results. That is, wireless operators may find it 
worthwhile to evaluate new technologies using the ROA as strategic technology options. Through this study, network 
designers can begin to think in terms of the available network design options and to maximize overall gain in network design. 
Since the areas of the next generation wireless network architecture and technologies remain the subject of debate with no 
substantial implementation taking place, there is much work to do. With further research, this study can be expanded and 
further developed. 
Limitation and Future Research 
Since one of the implicit aims of this study is to understand how the real options approach can be used as a model for 
technology choice, we simplify matters where possible. For example, taking into account all the problems of reaching 
relevant data on technological development, we assume that the only available data are on current market shares (i.e., macro 
data) of competing technologies in generation. We hope to use more refined and enriched data in future research. 
The possibilities for future research on topics related to strategic technology management using the real options approach are 
extensive. Of them, a few of the possible extensions of the ideas covered in this paper.  
First, the US market with a suite of different technologies in use offers an interesting laboratory to test the real options 
approach as a strategic decision tool. Based on this preliminary practice of our real options model, we would like to develop a 
theory for a firm’s behavior analysis to solve strategic issues in the company level: for example, why do not all of the firms in 
wireless network industry to migrate or upgrade for the 3G services at the same time? Or why did some companies choose 
WCDMA instead of cdma2000, or else? 
Second, real option research is still very much a growing area. Thus there is much more that needs to be done. Although the 
conceptual foundation for real options is well established, there is scope for further research extensions to some of the basic 
theories, especially relating to valuation techniques. Options involving real technology choices and strategies are generally 
much more complex than simple financial options in stock market. First, the uncertainty may be due to several variables 
instead of simply one variable such as the price in financial options. Further, it may not always be easy to measure the value 
of underlying assets because of its dynamics and never traded in the market. These complexities may not allow one to find 
exact valuation model. 
Third, the other future research to come from this study will be the application of our real option theory and techniques to a 
variety of other industry to solve technology management problems, such as high-tech industry and medical industry. 
Conceptually any technology choice decision where significant uncertainties are present can be considered our strategic 
technology transition model using the real options approach. 
Finally, this study will take the form of helping wireless network service operators for a strategic decision to migrate their 
existing networks toward the next generation networks, by resolving the ambiguity of the nature of network evolution. Since 
still the areas of the next generation wireless network technologies and architectures remain in the debating stages with no 
substantial implementation results, the scope of study can be expanded with the further research in the future. 
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